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INTRODUCTION
I was honoured to be invited to give this lecture. Perhaps
I was rash when I asked what I should talk about. I was
invited to discuss the maxim that drafting is more an art
than a science. In doing so I was asked to explain why the
Parliamentary Counsel Office does not have a drafting
manual, and to say something about the way legislative
drafting will develop. This is quite a tall order. But (even
worse) I was asked to begin with something about the
philosophy of drafting.
PHILOSOPHY OF DRAFTING
I can dispose of the philosophy quickly. I decided to
consult the works of someone who was both a lawyer and
a philosopher, and I chose Francis Bacon. He gives a good
reason why philosophers do not make good legislators. In
The Advancement of Learning he says this –
“As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for
imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the
stars, which give little light, because they are so high.”
I think that the philosophy of drafting can be summed
up in two rules (not coined by me) –
“One – decide what you want to say.
Two – say it.”
To expand on that a little, the basic idea is to find out
what the client wants, analyse it to ensure that it stands up,
and express what is needed in language that is as precise
and clear as possible.
I would not want that simple summary to disguise the
real effort that the job entails. An appropriate thought is
one expressed by Bishop Stubbs. The first volume of his
great Constitutional History was published in 1874. The
preface opens with these rather forbidding words –
“The History of Institutions cannot be mastered – can
scarcely be approached – without an effort.”
Similarly, Acts and the study of Acts can be approached
only with an effort. And this arises from the very nature of
legislation.
THE ART OF DRAFTING
With all this in mind, let us turn to the theme that
legislative drafting is more an art than a precise science. In
the ninth century Agobert of Lyons, commenting on the
different laws prevailing in much of Europe, said that five
men meeting together might be subject to five different
personal laws. This has a particular resonance with me
because I often say that, if five drafters were set on the
same Bill, each might emerge with a different product. It is
true that there would normally be little of substance that
differed between the drafts. And we would rarely feel that
a colleague’s efforts were plain wrong. But we might well
say, “I would not have done it that way”. Now, if five
different drafters would produce five different Bills, it
suggests that legislative drafting is an art rather than a
precise science.
In essence I want to show that the composition of
legislation has little of the mechanical about it. I also hope
to give some idea of what it is really like to be a drafter. As
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry once said to me, there is scope
for letting more light shine in without spoiling the magic of
the Parliamentary Counsel Office.
ALL BILLS DIFFER – ANALYSIS
One reason why drafting is an art is that all Bills are
different. Private legal instruments (such as contracts or
leases) are often based on precedents. The legislative
drafter can very rarely draw on a precedent. Each Bill
needs to be approached as a unique exercise. This is
evident in the early stages of a Bill, when the drafter carries
out his function of discovering the department’s intention
and analysing the proposed policy to see whether it works.
In fact, this is one of his main tasks.
Let us take a simple example of this function. In the
1990s I drafted the legislation establishing landfill tax. One
problem was to define a disposal by way of landfill. I was
asked to follow some regulations which defined waste
disposal operations. When I looked at the items I saw that
one of them was (in effect) “tipping (for example landfill)”.
I said that we could not use this as part of a definition of
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landfill, because it referred to the very thing we were trying
to define. To define landfill to include “tipping (for
example landfill)” was rather like saying “an elephant is an
animal (for example, an elephant)”. Unless you know what
an elephant is to start with, it gets you nowhere.
This is a simple illustration of the point that the drafter
does not just do as he is bidden. If he believes that the
suggested approach is wrong, he says so. Let me take a
more homely example of the sort of questioning the
drafter has to exercise. In Thomas Love Peacock’s novel
Headlong Hall the landscaping of grounds is discussed. Mr
Gall refers to the characteristic of unexpectedness in a
landscape. Mr Milestone asks how unexpectedness is
apparent when a person walks round the grounds for the
second time.
But drafters are not unique. Like other people, they are
of course fallible. I drafted the poll tax legislation. At a
fairly late stage somebody (not myself but a member of the
instructing department) realised that we had imposed the
tax on everybody, including people like monks who had
made a vow of poverty and had nothing with which to pay.
We came up with an exemption. I punished myself for not
spotting the need for this. And I sometimes wonder how
many issues like this slip through the net altogether.
Anyhow, my point is that part of the drafter’s job is to
carry out a ruthless analysis. All Bills are different, and
each set of instructions requires its own individual analysis.
CREATIVE FUNCTION
My next point is that the drafter has a creative function.
If the department’s suggested approach does not work the
drafter does not simply reject it. If possible, he offers
something else – something that does work. In the case of
landfill tax, after discussion with the department’s officials
I attempted a definition of landfill. It was direct, and it
built on the simple basic idea of a deposit of material on or
under land. I am glad to say that it worked.
But the drafter has to be careful, because it is not for
him to make up the policy. I once drafted some provisions
to deal with the misbehaviour of football fans. I suggested
that a neat solution to football hooliganism would be to
ban the game altogether. I suggested this very much tongue
in cheek. But I think it illustrates the proposition that it is
not the drafter’s job to make up the policy, and that it
should not be his job. At the same time, it is part of his job
to offer workable solutions when possible.
The line between offering workable solutions (on the
one hand) and making up the policy (on the other hand) is
often a fine one. And a great deal of experience is needed
to judge where it lies in a given case. Some drafters are
prepared to go further than others in offering solutions.
The same drafter may be bolder on some Bills than on
others. Two different drafters may offer two different
solutions. You cannot predict in the case of any given Bill
where it is all going to lead.
Incidentally, if my ideas about policy on football were
unacceptable I wonder how Dr Johnson would have fared
as a policy maker. He once said this about marriage –
“I believe marriages would in general be as happy, and often
more so, if they were all made by the Lord Chancellor, upon a
due consideration of characters and circumstances, without the
parties having any choice in the matter.”
ITERATION
The process of analysis and coming up with a workable
policy is sometimes called an iterative one. It involves
throwing ideas back and forth between the drafter and the
instructing department, whose administrators and lawyers
will contribute ideas of their own. This iterative process is
not simply an intellectual game. The whole object is to
arrive at something that withstands examination in
Parliament and in the courts. It is better that the ideas are
tested and refined at the drafting stage than that they are
torn apart later. Francis Bacon puts it well in his essay “Of
Counsell”. He is referring to “counsel” in the sense of
advice. But he could equally be referring to Parliamentary
Counsel. He says this –
“Salomon hath pronounced, that In Counsell is Stability.
Things will have their first, or second Agitation; If they be not
tossed upon the Arguments of Counsell, they will be tossed
upon the Waves of Fortune; And be full of Inconstancy, doing,
and undoing, like the Reeling of a drunken man.”
There is of course a certain pleasure in this iterative
process. In discussing tavern discourse Dr Johnson puts it
like this –
“I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of
opinions and sentiments I find delight.”
So far, then, we have the points that all Bills are
different; that the drafter has to analyse everything to
ensure that it works; and that his role involves suggesting
workable solutions but not straying too far into the process
of making up the policy. The course which this iterative
process takes is different for each Bill, and it cannot be
predicted. I think these points help to illustrate the
proposition that drafting is an art rather than a precise
science.
COMPOSITION – PRELIMINARY
Having arrived at ideas that will stand up to analysis, the
drafter has to express them. I think it is generally accepted
that legal concepts and legal documents are often difficult
to understand. In the case of legislative drafting the
position is complicated by other factors. I want to mention
two factors. One relates to the legislative audience. The
other relates to the nature of legislation. 3
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AUDIENCE
First, then, there is the audience. In fact the drafter has
several audiences. There will be administrative and legal
civil servants, ministers, members of both Houses of
Parliament, practising barristers and solicitors, and judges.
There will also be the people the legislation affects. They
may range over a wide area, and a lot depends on the
nature of the Bill. At one extreme there may be specialists
(such as tax accountants or pension experts or scientists).
At the other extreme there may be laymen (perhaps lay
members of a board established to promote the arts).
The result of all this is that, in the case of any given Bill,
there will be an element of compromise and balance. For
instance, in drafting a provision to block a sophisticated tax
avoidance scheme the drafter’s main concern will be to
achieve certainty. That may involve sacrificing a degree of
ready intelligibility so far as (say) members of Parliament
are concerned. Striking the right balance in a given case
involves a good deal of judgment. And this is another
reason why drafting is an art rather than a precise science.
NATURE OF LEGISLATION
And then there is the peculiar nature of legislation. The
drafter works in a stark literary environment, and he is
denied some of the techniques allowed to other writers.
The nature of legislation was discussed by Sir
Christopher Jenkins (then the First Parliamentary
Counsel) in 1997 in a memorandum to the select
committee on the modernisation of the House of
Commons. I am drawing (gratefully) on what he said.
An Act has a precise and narrow object, which is to
change the law – no more and no less. It is not designed to
offer the things that other forms of writing offer (such as
entertainment, information, explanation, argument or
stimulation).
So an Act cannot employ all the usual techniques of
composition. For instance, it cannot say the same thing
twice merely to emphasise it. If it did, the reader would
wonder whether something stated only once was to have
equal effect. Nor can an Act say something twice but in
different words. If it did, the reader would wonder
whether it was trying to get across one message or two
different ones.
The consequence of all this is that the language of Acts
is tight and spare, and every word will be assumed to have
a purpose. So Acts can be approached only with an effort.
The stark literary background which Sir Christopher
describes brings to my mind a passage from Francis
Bacon’s essay “Of Studies”. He says this –
“Some Bookes are to be Tasted, Others to be Swallowed, and
Some Few to be Chewed and Digested: That is, some Books
are to be read onely in Parts; Others to be read but not
Curiously; And some Few to be read wholly, and with
Diligence and Attention.”
I would put statutes in the third category – that is, of
books that are to be chewed and digested, to be read
wholly and with diligence and attention. This is a factor
that arises largely from the very nature of legislation.
EXPLANATORY MATERIAL ETC
In recent years there has been a good deal of discussion
concerning the nature of legislation. Much of the
discussion has tended to concentrate on purpose
provisions and explanatory material.
Purpose provisions occur where the drafter expresses
the detailed rules and also states their purpose. For
instance, a tax provision might state, “this section is
enacted to prevent the avoidance of tax” and then proceed
to set out the specific rules designed to achieve that
purpose. The main danger is that the relationship between
the two sorts of provision is not clear. A declaration that a
section is enacted to prevent tax avoidance might lead
some readers to construe the precise rules one way and
other readers to construe them another way. Other readers
might conclude that the declaration has no effect in law.
The drafter should avoid this potential confusion. He can
make his intention clear in the specific rules themselves
and leave out the purpose provision.
Purpose provisions (if included in the legislative text at
all) are designed to be part of the operative legislative
material. Explanatory provisions are (as I understand it)
not meant to be part of the operative provisions. One
danger of explanation is that it might be couched in such
general terms as to be incomplete and therefore
misleading. Suppose an explanatory overview states that a
transferee becomes subject to tax if he becomes non-
resident. But suppose that when you get to the operative
provisions you find that the tax charge arises only in certain
cases of non-residence. If the explanatory overview causes
the reader to adopt the wrong assumption, it can cause him
trouble rather than help him. Another danger is that, if the
operative provisions are amended as the Bill goes through
Parliament or after enactment, the explanatory material
will be out of step unless that is amended too. The need for
that can be overlooked, especially if amendments are made
in a hurry (as they sometimes are).
The general view in the United Kingdom is that the best
place for explanatory material is in the explanatory notes
that now accompany Bills and Acts. As for purpose
provisions, I do not think there is a general acceptance of
their utility. And in 2004 the House of Lords select
committee on the constitution recommended that they
should not be included in Bills but that the explanatory
notes should state the purpose.
My own view is that the legislative text should be confined
to doing so much as is needed to change the law. Then the4
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reader knows that all the words count and are of equal
weight. Purpose provisions and explanations are too unruly
to include in the text of the Bill. The risk is that they create
obscurity. This view is not new. For instance, in the
sixteenth century Lucas de Penna deplored empty phrases
in laws, because they can obscure the object. I think we can
take “empty phrases” to include material not designed to
meet the precise object of changing the law (such as
purpose provisions) and material not intended to have
legislative effect at all (such as explanatory provisions).
I often envy writers to whom a wide variety of
techniques is available. For instance, a textbook might help
the reader by giving a summary of difficult technical
passages. That technique would not be available to the
legislative drafter, who operates in an environment where
all the words count and have equal weight. Nor would a
modern drafter adopt the exuberant repetition and
emphasis evident in this provision of an Act of Richard
III –
“It is ordered that the statute be annulled and utterly
destroyed, taken out of the Roll of Parliament, and be
cancelled and burnt, and be put in perpetual oblivion.”
So the drafter’s literary environment is a stark one.
Statutory language is by its nature compressed and spare.
The drafter is generally denied some of the techniques
available to other writers – such as repetition, explanation
and emphasis. One result is that the drafter relies heavily
on the techniques that are available to him. I now turn to
discuss some of the techniques employed by the legislative
drafter.
STRUCTURE
Before I get to the wording I want to say something
about the structure of a Bill. In the case of many Bills there
is no “right” structure. There are often several possible
ones, and the choice is up to the drafter. He will take pains
to present the material in a way that is logical and that puts
the reader to as little trouble as possible. In the case of
some legislation, complex provisions are inevitable. But the
drafter can help the reader if the initial provisions are easy
and he is led gently to the inevitable complexity.
Let us take landfill tax as an instance. A tax has three
essentials. They are the charge (that is, the situation in
which something is subjected to tax), the person who must
pay, and the amount charged. In the case of landfill tax, the
first four sections deal briefly with these three elements.
They secure that tax is charged on a taxable disposal,
defined as a disposal of waste by way of landfill at a landfill
site. They also secure that the landfill site operator must
pay. And they secure that the amount charged is so much
per tonne disposed of.
After reading these four relatively easy sections, the
reader will have a good idea of the basic structure of the
tax. Some concepts need elaboration, but this comes later.
For instance, there are definitions of a disposal as waste, a
disposal by way of landfill, a landfill site, and an operator of
a landfill site.
The reader is given the basic information in easy stages
at the outset. He is not bombarded with detail at the
beginning. Life is made easy for a reader coming to the
provisions for the first time. It would have been possible to
elaborate on each element as it cropped up. But then the
reader would not have found it as easy to get an immediate
bird’s eye view. And I felt that such a view was important,
especially for a new tax. The important point is that the
choice of how to structure the draft is generally for the
drafter. It involves judgment, and there are no hard and fast
rules.
And, of course, the drafter’s ideas are by no means
always acceptable. When I was drafting another new tax it
seemed to me that we could devise a better, simpler
structure than the one the department suggested. But I was
told that we had to adopt the department’s structure,
which sprang from a policy requirement for the tax to
follow accountancy practice.
So the drafter is sometimes denied the freedom to
practise his art. But where he is allowed freedom he will
take great pains over structure. And sometimes he will have
the nagging feeling that he should have taken a different
course. My suspicion is that readers of legislation are often
unaware of the amount of trouble that the drafter takes
over structure.
WORDING
I come now to the language used by the drafter. Here it
is possible to make various suggestions. But there are very
few hard and fast rules.
There has been much discussion in recent years
concerning plain language. I take this to mean language
that is as precise, clear and simple as the subject matter will
allow. A student wrote to me recently, asking whether there
is a move towards plain English in the legal profession and
how long it will take to change over completely to it. I
replied that a lot depends on what is meant by plain
English, and that developments in language never cease. I
continued, “So perfection is both incapable of definition
and unattainable. You just have to do your best in the
particular circumstances facing you, and each Bill requires
different techniques.”
Anyway, it is pleasing that the efforts of the
Parliamentary Counsel Office are recognised. In 2004 the
House of Lords select committee on the constitution
commended “the efforts of parliamentary counsel in
rendering bills in more accessible language”.
So the general idea is to express thoughts in language
that is as precise, clear and simple as the circumstances
allow. Let me now discuss just a few of the helpful drafting
techniques that are familiar to drafters. In this way I hope 5
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to illustrate the general point that there are very few hard
and fast rules. Everything depends on the particular
circumstances facing the drafter, who has to exercise
judgment.
LENGTH OF SENTENCES
The first technique relates to the length of sentences. To
understand a long sentence the reader may need to re-read
it several times and mentally divide it into digestible
smaller sentences. The drafter should generally save the
reader the trouble by dividing it up for him. Some people
suggest that a sentence should not exceed a given number
of words. Opinions vary on the number. It might perhaps
be 20 or 25 or 30. But, whatever it is, any suggestion can
be no more than a guide. In any event, generally speaking
Bills are now drafted in short sentences.
However, it is not always desirable to draft in short
sentences. For instance, a long sentence may be desirable
to avoid tedious repetition. This might occur where there
is a list of prohibited activities, and it may be absurd to
repeat the prohibition for each separate activity. Section
11(1) of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 reads –
“No person shall –
(a) construct premises he intends to be used to produce
chemical weapons;
(b) alter premises in circumstance where he intends
that they will be used to produce chemical
weapons;
(c) …………”
The subsection then proceeds for eight paragraphs in all,
listing different prohibited activities. It would be absurd to
have eight separate subsections, each beginning with “No
person shall”.
However, there is a qualification. This is that, if you do
use a long sentence, you need to take care. For instance, it
is best not to let a subject and its verb become separated by
a lengthy phrase. If it is, the reader may lose the connection
between them. So a structure like this should be avoided –
“A person who –
(a) conceals criminal property,
(b) disguises criminal property,
(c) converts criminal property,
(d) transfers criminal property, or
(e) removes criminal property from England and Wales
or from Northern Ireland,
commits an offence.”
The construction adopted in section 327(1) of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is better –
“A person commits an offence if he –
(a) conceals criminal property,
(b) [and so on]”.
In that case the reader is told the point straight away
(that an offence is committed). He does not have to wait
until the end of a long proposition in order to find out.
So, the proposition that sentences should be short needs
qualification – for instance, where a series of short
sentences would produce absurdity and a long sentence
would avoid absurdity. But the qualification itself needs
qualifying, in that if you do use a long sentence you should
take care – for instance, not to separate a subject from its
verb.
But the real point is that these are just a few thoughts. I
doubt whether anyone would be able to come up with a set
of rules that applied to every conceivable case facing the
drafter. In the end he will have to take each case as it comes
and exercise his judgment.
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE
The second technique is to prefer positive statements to
negative ones. They are usually easier to understand. They
are likely to be more direct and straightforward. For
instance, the second of these phrases is easier to follow
than the first –
“A tenant, other than one who does not have a lease for more
than three years, must register his rights.”
“A tenant who has a lease for more than three years must
register his rights.”
But it would be wrong to try to express everything as
positive statements. In particular, a double negative does
not always equate to a positive. For instance, these two
sentences do not have the same meanings –
“The appeal may proceed only if the tribunal has not certified
that the appeal is not validly made.”
“The appeal may proceed only if the tribunal has certified
that the appeal is validly made.”
Nor can a negative always be simply converted into a
positive that corresponds to it (or apparently corresponds
to it). That can easily change the meaning. A colleague once
drafted a Bill about shipping. It contained a reference to a
ship that was not a British registered ship. A reader felt that
this was inelegant, and that the reference should be to a
foreign registered ship. But he had overlooked the fact that
many ships are not registered at all. The drafter’s Bill
caught these, but the reader’s version would not. The
reader’s version was simpler, but it produced the wrong
result.
So the drafter needs to take great care. Each case
depends on its own circumstances. You cannot lay down
rules applicable to all cases.
ACTIVE OR PASSIVE
The third technique I want to mention is to prefer the
active voice to the passive. Readers generally find it easier6
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to understand. For instance, the second of these is easier
than the first –
“If a notice which satisfies the prescribed conditions is served
by the Secretary of State…..”
“If the Secretary of State serves a notice which satisfies the
prescribed conditions…..”
Another factor is that the passive tends to conceal. For
instance, if you say “notice must be given” before a
particular date, it is not clear who must give the notice. If
the active voice is used (“x must give notice”) the drafter
and those instructing him at least have to think who “x” is
supposed to be.
But it would be wrong to assert that the drafter must
always use the active. Sometimes he uses the passive
deliberately. For example, a provision might say that “if the
council serves a notice, and a counter-notice is served on
it, the council may not proceed”. Here the passive may be
deliberate because it does not matter who serves the
counter-notice.
So there is no automatic rule that everything should be
expressed in the active rather than the passive. The golden
rule is that you need to think about each case on its merits.
DRAFTER’S FALLIBILITY
In choosing the wording, as in other matters, drafters
are of course fallible. I drafted the Sale of Goods Act 1979,
which consolidates the previous law. The Act applies to all
contracts made on or after 1 January 1894 (when the 1893
Act came into operation). So section 1(1) of the 1979 Act
reads –
“This Act applies to contracts of sale of goods made on or
after (but not to those made before) 1 January 1894.”
After the Act was passed someone pointed out a glaring
ambiguity. Was it the contract or the goods that had to be
made on or after 1 January 1894? Internal evidence within
the Act shows that the provision means (as intended) the
contract. But I could have avoided the ambiguity.
CHANGING LANGUAGE
I have now illustrated some of the techniques available to
the drafter. And I hope I have illustrated the proposition
that he has to exercise a good deal of judgment. You cannot
lay down rules capable of applying in every conceivable
instance. Another factor is that language is always changing,
and statutory language is no exception. In this way
improvements are made. It would be wrong to hinder
progress by seeking to lay down rules.
For instance, the traditional style of drafting tended to
bind propositions by references back to other ones. This is
often unnecessary, because successive propositions are
naturally read together anyway. For instance, subsection (1)
of section 3 of the Transport Act 2000 provides that –
“A person commits an offence if he provides air traffic services
in respect of a managed area.”
Subsection (3) then provides for an exception if “the
person is authorised by an exemption to provide the services”.
At one time the exception might have been expressed in
terms of “the person referred to in subsection (1) above”
and “the services referred to in subsection (1) above”. Or
it might have been expressed in terms of “the person
concerned” or “the services concerned”. As it is, the
references are simply to “the person” and “the services”.
There is no need for more where the context makes it clear
who or what is being referred to. I do not know when
drafters started to omit the unnecessary clutter. But I am
glad that they felt able to do so. It would have been
unhelpful to have a rule that cross-references are always
necessary or desirable. The absence of such a rule left
drafters free to experiment with new techniques – or, to
put it another way, to practise their art.
Taking another example of change, many provisions used
to start with expressions like “Subject to subsection (2)
below”. This will distract the reader from the main
proposition. It is often best to state the main proposition
first and then to state the exception. And in appropriate
cases the exception can be preceded by a word such as
“But”. For instance, section 10 of the Transport Act 2000
reads –
“(1) No action is to lie in respect of a failure by a licence
holder to perform –
(a) a duty imposed by section 8;
(b) a condition of a licence.
(2) But subsection (1) does not affect –
(a) a right of action in respect of an act or omission
which takes place in the course of the provision of
air traffic services;
(b) ……….”
I do not know when drafters first adopted this more
direct approach. But I am glad that they felt able to try out
new ideas. In fact I believe that in many cases there is no
need even for a word like “but”. In the example I have just
given the “but” could easily be dropped, because the words
“subsection (1) does not affect….” do all that is needed.
We have to accept that some experiments might not find
favour. Let us consider an experiment. In private
documents we sometimes find the reader addressed as
“you”. For instance, some insurance contracts address the
insured person as “you”. This device is used little in
statutes. But there is at least one instance in a recent draft
Bill. Provisions which set out the general duties owed by a
director of a company to the company use the second
person (“you”). For instance –
“As a director of a company you must exercise reasonable care,
skill and diligence.”
At first this seems to be a reasonable use of the second
person. The provisions are addressed to the director 7
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because he is the person who must fulfil the duties. And
there is a directness about the style that appeals.
On the other hand, most statutes are directed at more
than one person. Even the provisions about directors’
duties are meant for consumption by people in addition to
the director. For instance, there are lawyers and
accountants who advise the company and those who advise
the director, and there are the courts. These people have to
make a mental adjustment when reading the legislation if it
is addressed to “you”. There is also the point that “you” is
not apt if the director is itself a company (which is
possible). The result is that the experiment found little
favour. And the device was dropped from the Bill.
The important point is that changes in drafting come
about because drafters do not slavishly follow pre-ordained
techniques. They feel able to practise their art in the way
they see fit. They feel free to experiment. And they feel free
not to proceed with an experiment.
DRAFTING MANUAL
Let me try to summarise. All Bills are different. All ideas
for legislation need analysis and creative ideas from the
drafter, and you cannot predict where the iterative process
will lead you. The nature of legislation is unusual because
its object is limited. This means that the drafter operates in
a stark and precise literary environment, where he is
denied some of the techniques available to other authors.
In using the techniques that are available to him, there is no
automatic solution and everything requires judgment.
Language and techniques change all the time, and I hope
they always will. In short, legislative drafting is more an art
than a precise science.
The Parliamentary Counsel Office does not have a
manual seeking to tell drafters how to do the job. We do
have Office manuals on a number of topics, such as various
aspects of Parliamentary procedure. But there is not much
Office know-how on drafting itself. Maybe this is partly
attributable to the British dislike of writing rules down.
But I think there is more to it than that. There are good
reasons for not writing rules down, or at least for not
having a rigid manual. One is that the very nature of the job
means that there is limited scope for learning things from
books or manuals. You cannot lay down rules for every
conceivable situation. Another reason is that techniques,
language and general approach change and must be allowed
freedom to do so.
On the other hand, it is possible to offer some guidance
on drafting. And various developments are taking place in
the Parliamentary Counsel Office. First, we have for some
time offered seminars to trainees to supplement our
system of training on the job. And we are beginning to
incorporate guidance on modern drafting techniques. But
this amounts only to suggestions, and nothing is
prescribed.
Secondly, we have been wondering whether there are
matters on which drafters could (or should) achieve greater
consistency. Do our readers wonder why different drafters
adopt different approaches even on relatively minor things?
Take an apparently simple example. Suppose you use a
section to insert a paragraph into a Schedule in another
Act. You will end the inserted paragraph with a full-stop
and closed quotation marks. Do you add another full-stop
after the closed quotation marks, to end the section itself?
Some people feel strongly that you should, because the
rules of punctuation strictly require it. Others (such as
myself) think you should omit the second full-stop,
because it looks ugly and because there is no doubt that the
thought has come to an end.
The passions raised by this issue remind me of the
passage in Gulliver’s Travels where Swift discusses the
“obstinate war” between the two great empires of Lilliput
and Blefuscu brought about by a disagreement. Many
people have died in the war, and Swift tells us that “many
hundred large volumes have been published upon this
controversy.” And what was this disagreement? It was over
whether eggs should be broken at the bigger end or the
smaller end. Pope put the sentiment more succinctly in The
Rape of the Lock when he said –
“What mighty contests rise from trivial things”.
Taking a more complex example, there is the legislative
“shall”. Traditionally, Acts contained phrases like “It shall
be the duty of the Secretary of State to keep the arts under
review (or whatever)”. But the word “shall” is not generally
used (outside legal documents) in this sense. In common
speech it is generally taken to imply a statement about the
future rather than to impose an obligation. In my view it is
often enough simply to say, “The Secretary of State
must….” And a phrase like “This Act shall extend to
England and Wales only” can be expressed as “This Act
extends to England and Wales only”. On the other hand it
is difficult to replace the legislative “shall” in setting up a
statutory body. For instance, section 1(1) of the Scotland
Act 1998 provides that –
“There shall be a Scottish Parliament.”
But I know that the legislative “shall” can arouse deep
passions. Some drafters are sticking to it more than others.
Perhaps I had better leave it at that.
The point is whether there is room for greater
consistency within the Office on a range of fairly standard
matters. We have now set up a drafting techniques group
in the Office to consider this, and their work is well under
way. They have produced valuable papers on a number of
matters. Let me give two instances.
First, there is the question of extent. An Act is assumed
to extend to all the United Kingdom unless it states
otherwise. So why (for instance) do some Acts intended to
extend to Northern Ireland expressly so provide, and why
do some refrain from so providing? Is the difference in8
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practices justified? Secondly, there are the words
introducing Schedules. Why (for instance) do clauses that
introduce amendment Schedules use different approaches?
Some examples are –
“Schedule 4 (minor and consequential amendments) has
effect.”
“Schedule 3 contains minor and consequential amendments.”
Should we be consistent in matters like this?
Incidentally, in one of the group’s papers (on
paragraphing) I find these wise words: “legislative drafting
does not lend itself to hard and fast rules…..different
solutions may work better in different contexts.” And that
brings me to a very important point. It is not intended that
the work of the group will go beyond suggestions. There
will be no seeking to impose rules on drafters. There are
two reasons why you cannot (or at least should not) go
further. One is that all Bills are different, with their own
unique problems, and it is not possible to formulate rules
covering all imaginable cases. The other is that you must
leave room for techniques and approaches to develop and
improve.
THE FUTURE
As for the future, nobody knows. But we can guess. I
believe that training drafters on the job over several years
will remain the backbone of our training system. There
may be a call for more systematic teaching of modern
drafting techniques. There may be room for greater
consistency on some matters. Whatever emerges will be
confined to suggestions. It will not be prescriptive.
Drafters will continue to experiment and to make
improvements. No doubt they will try things they later
regret. But drafting will never become a mechanical task
capable of conforming to set rules. And change will never
stop. Drafting will always be an art.
CLARITY OF THOUGHT AND ANALYSIS
Above all, it will always be the clarity of thought and the
depth of analysis that matter most. And you cannot
become skilled in these by reading manuals. If the basic
analysis or thinking is unsound, the draft will be unsound.
As Doctor Johnson said –
“Most men think indistinctly, and therefore cannot speak with
exactness.”
But if the analysis is sound, and the thinking is clear,
clarity of expression will often follow. You can learn a
certain amount from studying various techniques. But in
the end you just have to do your best in the particular
circumstances facing you, and each Bill requires different
techniques (to quote myself when I advised the student
asking about plain English).
PHILOSOPHY
We started with philosophy, and we shall end with it.
The thought of philosophy tends to bring to my mind a
passage in Boswell. A certain Edwards, who was at
Pembroke College Oxford with Doctor Johnson, says –
“You are a philosopher, Dr Johnson. I have tried too in my
time to be a philosopher; but I don’t know how; cheerfulness
was always breaking in.”
The following observation of Doctor Johnson the
philosopher seems particularly appropriate after I have
talked for the best part of an hour -
“The utmost which we can reasonably hope or fear, is to fill a
vacant hour with prattle, and be forgotten.”
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